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Abstract 
This article explores how the idea of a canal connecting the Dead Sea with either the Red Sea or the 
Mediterranean Sea has evolved. It analyses the proposals, the official interests, and the undeclared 
reasons. It provides a critical understanding of the discourses behind the complex hydro-political 
dynamics in a changing and contested topography within a context of a wider geopolitical conflict. 
This study sheds lights on the relations between interests, discourses, and the canal project. The key 
finding is that competing interests, discourses, and actors have emerged supporting or challenging a 
canal plan. 
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 Introduction 
The issue of a canal connecting the Dead Sea with either the Mediterranean Sea or 
the Red Sea has been widely studied. The plan of linking the Dead Sea with either of 
the other seas goes back at least to 1665, and, this article argues, the discourses 
backing the plan have changed as the interests behind the plan evolved due to 
changes in the broader contexts. However, the literature lacks a comprehensive study 
on the history of these projects – and the interests behind them -, as most attention 
was on studies of feasibility from engineering or socio-economic studies (Al-Omari, 
Salman, & Karablieh, 2014; Arad, Beyth, & Vardi, 1990; Beyth, 2007; McPhail & 
Lintner, 2013; Salem, 2009; Willner et al., 2013). Therefore, this article investigates 
the history of plans for connecting the Dead Sea with either the Red or Mediterranean 
Sea, contributing to the literature of water history.  
The literature on water history focuses on increasing historical understanding of 
the relationship between water and humankind. Water history shed lights on the 
complex processes that have impacted water resources, their management, and use, 
shaping water resources over time, situating them in the historical broader contexts. 
By looking at the historical broader context, it is therefore possible to understand why 
water resources have been imagined and shaped in particular directions, unpacking 
the contingents reasons of the time influencing these decisions. In this sense, 
investigating water from a historical perspective allows understanding of the broader 
context of that time, hence of the evolving economic, political, social, and 
environmental history. 
This work also explores how the plans, the discourses, and the interests behind 
them fit into the broader contexts, as the highly securitised context of the Lower 
Jordan River (LJR), the wider Arab-Israeli conflict and security issues cannot be 
ignored. Recent studies show how discourses are deployed to influence water 
policies, with several articles discussing the Israeli- Palestinian case in particular 
(Feitelson, Tamimi, & Rosenthal, 2012; Fischhendler & Katz, 2012; Fröhlich, 2012; 
Jägerskog, 2001; Mason, 2013; Messerschmid, 2012). It emerges that while 
discourses are deployed by actors to support their interests and to drive towards 
certain solutions, discourses need to be situated within the broader context (Hussein 
& Grandi 2017; Hussein, 2016). Recent literature has also showed that discourses are 
one among other elements influencing water governance, and therefore they need to 
be contextualised within the historical period they were suggested (ibid.). 
The data deployed in this article comes primarily from reports, semi-structured 
interviews, and documentation collected during fieldwork in the Levantine region 
 between July 2011 and December 2014, as well as secondary literature and material 
published online. 
 
Analysis of Historical Plans and Discourses 
This article reviews the plans around a canal connecting the Dead Sea, as well as the 
interests and discourses around these plans. This article investigates the evolving 
discourses over time, as the plans are suggested in order to solve perceived problems 
or issues of the period they are suggested. Discourses are central in constructing and 
defining what the issue is in people’s minds, and consequently driving towards what 
the best solution – in this case plan – to solve the issue is. In other words, discourses  
represent the issue, they open a range of suitable solutions for the identified issue, and 
silence others not in line with their representation of the issue (Leach and Mearns, 
1996). Dominant discourses are therefore powerful as they drive towards certain 
solutions in line with the understanding of the issue constructed and reproduced by the 
dominant discourses.  
Hajer (1995), and later Dryzek (1997), argues that discourses frame an issue in 
a way that policy makers can solve it by identifying appropriate solutions. Hajer 
(1995, p. 44) defines discourse as “an ensemble of ideas, concepts, and categories 
through which meaning is given to social and physical phenomena, and which is 
produced and reproduced through an identifiable set of practices.” Discourse 
coalitions comprise actors that for different interests support a particular framing of an 
issue, driving towards - albeit for different reasons and interests - the same way of 
talking and thinking about it, opening similar solutions and policies (Hajer, 1995). 
This article therefore examines the historical evolving discourses over a project of a 
Dead Sea Canal, situating the discourses in the historical period and within the broader 
context of that time. 
This section outlines the historical evolution of the ideas of a canal, examining 
the discourses and interests behind the different plans, as well as the broader contexts 
that motivated the changes. This section first analyses the period until the nineteenth 
century; second it looks at the twentieth century until 1973; third it explores the 1970s 
and 1980s; fourth it investigates the 1990s until 2009; and finally the period from 
2009 until the current days.  
 While the idea of a Dead Sea canal is not a new one, the interests, motivated by 
changes in the broader context, saw a parallel construction of discourses supporting 
the plans. As outlined in the table below, the actors behind the plans and discourses 
evolved: individual explorers backed by their governments in the 17th-19
th centuries; 
 Zionist leaders backed by Zionist discourses in the twentieth century; governments in 
the second half of the twentieth century; and governments, NGOs, the private sector, 
and international organisations in the last decades. Also the discourses evolved: 
transportation in the nineteenth century, Zionism, irrigation, hydropower, and state - 
building in early twentieth century; hydropower until the 1980s; regional peace and 
cooperation, stabilise the Dead Sea level, and desalinisation since the 1990s 
(Fischhendler, Cohen-Blankshtain, Shuali, & Boykoff, 2013, p. 5).. 
 
[Table 1 here] 
 
A Shorter Way to India (up to the nineteenth century) 
The idea to link the Dead Sea to the Red Sea goes back to 1665, when the Jesuit 
scholar Athanasius Kircher mentioned in “Mundus Subterraneus” that the two seas 
could be linked (Kempe, Naumann, & Dunsch, 2013, p. 3), understood by Glausiusz 
(2010) as a canal for transportation purposes (Glausiusz, 2010, p. 1119).  
Also for transportation purposes, in 1855, the English captain William Allen 
(Allen, 2013) suggested a network of canals from the Mediterranean Sea (from 
Haifa) via Tiberias to the Jordan River, the Dead Sea, and down to the Red Sea (to 
Aqaba) , abandoning the idea of passing through the French - controlled Suez area 
(Abitbol, 2006, p. 96; Allen, 2013, p. 343; Asmar, 2003, p. 331). Allen describes the 
benefits of this canal – which are the interests behind this project - as mainly 
commercial: a shorter way (time- wise) to India “instead of taking the circuitous 
route of Cape of Good Hope” (Allen, 2013, p. 343) for the Empire, and more 
revenues for the local Sultan for the transit on the canals (ibid: 344). The canal route 
would be longer than transiting via land, but it “would be equalised by the time taken 
by the transit through Egypt” (Allen, 2013, p. 343).  
The official discourse about the British Empire backed research on the 
Mediterranean Sea – Dead Sea – Red Sea (Med-Dead-Red) plan was mainly for 
opening a convenient route to India (Goren, 2011, p. 22-23). However, the undeclared 
interest was to maintain the British global naval role, challenged by the French plans 
of constructing the Suez Canal (Fletcher, 1958, p. 564; Hoskins, 1943, p. 373). 
Instead, the French discourses were challenging the British global naval hegemony, 
and supported research in the region on the construction of a Suez Canal (ibid). 
Among the British discourses against the French project, there was a discourse of 
“slave labour” forced to work in precarious conditions on the canal. The British 
Empire has also supported a revolt among the employees on the canal aiming (and 
then resulting) in the abolition of the corvee system (Brown, 1994, p. 122-124; 
 Quirke,  2009, p. 227-228). 
The relevant actors in the region were British business interests (private sector) 
backed by their governments, and the Ottoman Empire ruling on Palestine until the 
First World War. Officials of the British Empire, including General Charles Gordon, 
suggested the plan several times in the following decades. The discourse was mainly 
constructed through declarations of explorers, influential businessmen, and 
governmental officials. The discourses were constructed and reproduced by 
governmental institutions and voiced by national media, and they were situated 
within the broader context and in line with the governmental interests and 
geopolitical alliances. 
There were also some discourses potentially challenging Allen’s idea. 
However, they are acknowledged by the English captain but simply considered as 
“sacrifices” (Allen, 2013, p. 343): 2,000 square miles will be submerged, together 
with the city of Tiberias of some thousands inhabitants, and a few Arab villages. In 
addition, the “Jews (…) would object strongly to the loss of Tiberias, which is one of 
the four holy cities” (ibid: 345). However, for Allen, “they are strangers from Russia, 
Poland, & c., who have no property in it, and come there in the hope of seeing the 
Messiah rise out of the lake, which is a general expectation among them, though on 
what authority it is not known” (ibid: 345). These counter-discourses were not 
prominent at that time and did not make it into the public media domain in England, 
and were acknowledged as potential discourses by Allen. 
 
Hydropower Production, Irrigation, within the Zionist Political Ideology 
(1902 - 1973) 
As the Suez Canal opened for shipping in 1869, having an impact on the British 
shipping industry and trade (Fletcher, 1958, p.556), the British Empire interest in a 
Mediterranean Sea – Dead Sea Canal (MSDSC) for transportation decreased. The 
shift in trade routes by the opening of the Suez Canal coincided with the rise of 
Zionism during the late nineteenth century – beginning twentieth century. At that 
time, nationalist ideologies affected European people - including European Jews - and 
an increasing anti-Semitism in Europe - culminated in the Dreyfus affair in France 
and in pogroms in Eastern Europe (including the Russian Empire) - resulted in the 
Zionist movement calling for a Jewish nation in Palestine (Zoltán, 2010, p. 199). 
Palestine was under the Ottoman Empire until the end of the First World War, and 
then a British Mandate until 1948 (year of establishment of Israel). After 1948, the 
main actors became Israel, Jordan and the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO). 
 This broader context is key to understand the new discourses and interests in 
relation to the construction of a canal. While first Kremensky and then Bourcart 
suggested a canal for hydropower generation to Theodor Herzl, founder of political 
Zionism, in the last years of the nineteenth century, Herzl published in 1902 
Altneuland, a novel outlining Herzl’s vision for a Jewish state. This, together with 
declarations of Zionist leaders of the time, constructed the new discourse supporting 
the canal. The main text for the interpretation and construction of this new discourse 
around the canal is Herzl’s novel and following declarations of Zionist leaders. In this 
novel, he outlines his vision of a Mediterranean Sea Dead Sea Canal (MSDSC) for 
hydropower and irrigation (Asmar, 2003, p. 331; Beyth, 2007, p. 365). Substantiation 
of this emerges from the text itself: 
 
 
“We take great quantities of fresh water from it [the canal], which are pumped into 
reservoirs and used for irrigation in areas where water is as necessary as it is 
superfluous here. […] The water power at source had attracted many industries” 
(Herzl, 1902, book IV). 
 
The agriculture and hydropower discourses were strategic for the Zionist 
plans of creating a Jewish state for several reasons (Fröhlich, 2012, p. 129; Zeitoun, 
2008, p. 63) as they embedded the following interests: to feed the growing Jewish 
population (and linked with the absorptive capacity of Palestine); to build a new 
identity (Fröhlich, 2012, p. 129; Jägerskog, 2001, p. 3-4) - having an important 
nation-building role (Elmusa, 1996, p. 70; Feitelson, 2002, p. 300; Lowi, 1995, 
Alatout, 2006); and to produce electricity and hydropower for a future Jewish state 
(Elmusa, 1996, p. 70). Lipchin (2008) asserts that water was also used as an argument 
to convince the world that they should "give" Zionists the land, because they 
managed the land efficiently with advanced technological methods, making the 
“desert bloom;” it was an argument that fit in well with the productivity and 
efficiency discourses that were emerging at the time (Lipchin, 2008, p. 77-78).  
David Ben-Gurion in 1935 and Weizmann in 1947 reiterated the importance 
of the conveyance project in order to secure water resources for a future Israeli state. 
This is a clear instance of what Hajer calls as discourse alliance, meaning different 
discourses that embed different interests and support and open the same solution, in 
this case the canal project. This discourse was dominant within the Zionist 
movement, it was constructed and sanctioned by Zionist leaders, and it was deployed 
 by Zionists aiming at seeking support from within the movement and from the 
Western countries for the construction of a canal. 
 
 Hydropower as the main guiding Discourse (1970s-1980s) 
After Herzl’s plan, the idea of taking advantage of the elevation (being the Dead Sea 
the lowest point on earth being about -400m) was suggested for producing 
hydropower during the British Mandate by: the engineers Rutenberg in 1920 and 
Blass in 1943, Ladermilk in 1944, Mekorot (Simcha Blass) in 1941, and the Jewish 
Agency in 1945 (Stern & Gradus, 1981, p. 265). After the establishment of the state 
of Israel, in 1948, the government commissioned several studies on the construction 
of a conveyance project, including: Cotton report in 1955, Batz and Haversham in 
1966. However, the project for hydropower was strongly considered by the Israeli 
government only after the 1973 energy crisis (Beyth, 2007, p. 365-366; Glausiusz, 
2010; Stern & Gradus, 1981, p. 265), when the discourse of energy security became 
dominant.  
The broader context allows understanding of this shift: after the Balfour 
declaration in 1917, the Jewish Agency further sanctioned the discourse of 
hydropower as vital for enabling the establishment of an Israeli state; only after the 
1973 energy crisis the discourse of national energy security became dominant in the 
public media and domain, linking the energy issue with national security. These 
discourses were firstly constructed by the Jewish Agency and Zionist leaders, and by 
the Israeli government after 1948, embedding the interests of the actors constructing 
and deploying these discourses. 
In 1973, a MSDSC Israeli plan was guided by energy interests, but this was  not 
the only reason (Steinberg, 1987, p. 340-342). This article argues that another 
discourse supporting the project was the technological and scientific symbol of the 
project itself.  On the one hand, the hydropower interest, guided by the energy security 
discourse informed by the energy crisis of 1973, resulted in the government 
commissioning different studies on the issue. For instance, in 1974 the government 
established a committee to explore options for hydropower generation, in 1976 the 
Tahal Group was commissioned an assessment on the different options found by the 
committee.  
On the other hand, the discourse on the technological advancement, for 
Steinberg, was also at play. This discourse was constructed and deployed by the 
Israeli government and is to be seen directed to a Jewish audience and as an 
 undeclared interest. This symbol of technological and scientific advancement can 
have symbolic importance for the Jewish worldwide population, “a source of pride 
that extended beyond rational cost-benefit calculations” (Steinberg, 1987, p. 342). 
Both these discourses backed the construction of a canal, for different interests. 
However, due to financial and political reasons, the 1973 MSDSC plan was 
abandoned in 1985 (Gavrieli, Bein, & Oren, 2005, p. 9). 
Nevertheless, counter-discourses were also deployed to oppose the 
construction of such a canal. The main actors constructing and deploying counter- 
discourses were NGOs, international organisations, and governments. In fact, the 
international community strongly opposed the plan for several reasons: human rights, 
sovereignty, and international law concerns (among others, from China  and USSR); 
ecological, nuclear fears; and potential economic damages to the Jordanian industries 
(Jordan) (UNGA, 1981, UNEP, 1983). These shows a multiplicity of counter-
discourses guided by different interests and a variety of actors, all opposing the Israeli 
discourse for a canal. These counter-discourses were deployed to shape decisions in 
the international organisations’ institutions. This resulted in the United Nations 
General Assembly (UNGA) passing resolutions demanding the Israeli government to 
cease planning the MSDSC. 
In 1981, as a response to the Israeli MSDSC plan, the Jordanian government 
briefly considered a Red Sea - Dead Sea Canal (RSDSC), with hydropower as the 
main driver (Asmar, 2003; Nahhal, 1982). This project would have been politically 
less controversial, as not raising international concerns linked to issues of human 
rights, and with marginal interference with groundwater and agricultural activities. 
However, the discourses against this plan were two: a hydrological discourse as it 
would have been passing through a seismic area and an economic discourse as it was 
more expensive than the MSDSC plan because longer (Asmar, 2003, p. 332). 
Nevertheless, this would have been more feasible considering the broader context in 
which it was situated. 
The energy security and hydropower discourse and interest were at play also 
in the plans suggested in the 1990s, but this article argues in the section below that 
they were not the main dominant drivers of the suggested plans, but minor discourses. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 After the Peace Agreements: saving the shrinking Dead Sea and provide 
 Fresh Water? (1990s – 2009) 
The Oslo agreement signed in 1993 between the Israeli government and the PLO 
included a declaration calling for inter-regional economic development plans, while 
the peace agreement signed between the Israeli and Jordanian governments in 1994 
called for regional watershed development and cooperation (Murakami, 1995b). 
Hence, only after 1994, a regional cooperation could be politically viable and the 
momentum for transboundary water cooperation was created (Murakami, 1995a, 
1995b). After the Oslo agreements, the main actors became the Israeli, Jordanian 
governments and the Palestinian Authority (officially known as Palestine  as of 2012). 
The role of the broader context is strategic in shaping interests, plans, and 
discourses around the canal project. In fact, these bilateral agreements had a strong 
impact on the regional context, “animating” the discourses surrounding. While in the 
past the Israeli and Jordanian governments saw each other as enemies, now they 
consider themselves as neighbours and potential partners for the economic 
development of the Jordan Valley (Brand, 1999, p. 60). The agreements resulted in a 
change of interests and discourses guiding the canal plan. This article argues that 
while before the agreements the political conflict was between the governments, now 
it is between pro and anti-project sides. 
The World Bank had a key role in promoting regional cooperation for a 
RSDSC. A regional feasibility study in 1996 had as goals mainly desalinisation and 
the stabilisation of the level of the Dead Sea. This study, commissioned by the World 
Bank and financed by the Italian government, was produced by the Harza Group. The 
Harza  Group  conducted  an  extensive  pre-feasibility study for  the  RSDSC project, 
considering five different alignments from a technical, environmental, and economic 
perspectives, and concluded that the most appropriate alignment was the one entirely 
within Jordanian territory and 203 km long (Asmar, 2003, p. 332; Gavrieli et al., 
2005, p. 10). The main goal of the proposed project was to create potable water 
through desalinisation. Other additional goals that were identified were: the 
stabilisation of the level of the Dead Sea, the production of hydropower, developing 
the area, and strengthening the Israeli-Jordanian relations (ibid). 
The supporting discourses constructed at that time mainly by governmental 
officials and World Bank personnel included: the need for water sources to combat 
water scarcity, saving the dying Dead Sea, and foster regional cooperation (Asmar, 
2003, p. 332; Gavrieli et al., 2005, p. 10). These discourses were deployed in donors’ 
arenas, public meetings, and conferences, and were reproduced by local and 
international media. Nevertheless, the study also identified potential negative 
 impacts: on the environment, on the health thermal tourism sector, and the local 
industries. In addition, the risks for terroristic attacks and the seismic area were 
identified as negative aspects (Asmar, 2003, p.332-333). 
In 2002 the Israeli and Jordanian governments publicly committed to a project 
to save the shrinking Dead Sea (Gavrieli et al. 2005: 10) backing it with the peace 
and regional cooperation discourse. These discourses were clearly situated in the 
broader context, as they were a product of the Peace Treaty signed by the two 
governments in 1994, and in line with the efforts of international donors of 
strengthening the political economy relations between Israel and Jordan. However, 
also the delay in agreeing on a feasibility study of the project is explainable by 
consideration of the broader context.  
In fact, only in 2005, after the end of the intifada, Israelis, Jordanians, and 
Palestinians agreed to conduct a feasibility study for a RSDSC plan, coordinated by 
the World Bank (WB, 2013). The Palestinians were not members of the project in 2002, 
as the intifada was starting. In 2005, also the Palestinians agreed to support this project. 
While the main goal of this project is the stabilisation of the level of the Dead Sea, 
minor goals were “Desalinate water / generate energy at affordable prices for Jordan, 
Israel, and the Palestinian   Authority; [and] Build a symbol of peace and cooperation 
in the Middle East” (ToR WB, 2005: 8). 
However, there are official discourses and interests, and undeclared ones, as 
summarised by Yaakov Garb, a professor at Ben-Gurion University of the Negev who 
participated in the World Bank study: “it’s basically a ‘drinking water for Amman’ 
project that is disguised as a ‘saving the Dead Sea’ project” (Levitan, 2012).  
Discourses against the plan were developed and backed on environmental basis from 
local NGOs, especially during the publication of ToR and during the public 
consultations in the region done by the World Bank. The discourse alliance against the 
plan is not only environmentalists, but comes also from other sectors: the Israeli 
Environmental Protection Minister Gilad Ardan fearing a negative impact on the 
health tourist industry (Orsam, 2013) and a group of twenty NGOs for social justice, 
demonstrating that environment and society cannot be separated.  
 
Jordanian Water Scarcity Discourse as a Driver for the Canal (2009 - 
Present) 
In 2009, following delays  of the RSDSC plan seen by the Jordanian government   as 
mainly due to the Israeli civil society, the Jordanian government announced the 
intention to proceed with a Jordanian only plan called “Jordan Red Sea Project.” This 
 project would bring water from the Red Sea to the Dead Sea, having as a priority goal 
desalinisation and water supply to Jordan, and as other minor goals stabilising the 
Dead Sea level, and hydropower production. The project is supported by the  
Jordanian water scarcity discourse, “the country’s water security is dependent on the 
desalination of seawater in the future,” as underlined by Mousa Jamani, Water and 
Irrigation minister of Jordan (Namrouqa, 2012), and by the climate change discourse 
(Al-Omari et al., 2014; Earle et al., 2015). 
The RSDSC project is one of the most prominent solutions opened by the  
water scarcity discourse in Jordan, and it is seen as a priority for the national water 
security of the country. For a former minister of the Ministry of Water and Irrigation 
(MWI), “the national water security in Jordan is related to the RSDSC project”, as the 
only solution for the water scarcity in Jordan can be desalination (interview 1). Al 
Hamidi reports in the Jordanian newspaper Al Rai that for Jordanian specialists and 
governmental officials “the ‘two seas project’ is the only sustainable solution to solve 
the water scarcity issue” (Al Hamidi, 2012). In addition, it shows that for the 
Jordanian government the natural solution to water scarcity, often also referred to as 
the only solution, is to be found on the supply side, through mega projects and 
engineering solutions, and the RSDSC is a key project and an important national 
priority (Al  Hamidi,  2012).   
The  Jordanian Prime Minister Ensour stated that the RSDSC will be able to 
solve the water scarcity issue, which is further aggravated by the Syrian refugees 
(Editor, 2015). This is also the line supported in the Jordanian textbooks, where the 
construction of dams and of the RSDSC project are strongly supported and never 
questioned and seen  as  the solution for the issue of water scarcity. At conferences on 
water resources in Jordan, Jordanian high level water professionals from the MWI 
continuously underlined and emphasised the necessity of building the RSDSC as the 
only long term solution to the issue of water scarcity in Jordan, as water  scarcity in 
Jordan is due to the limited water resources available.  
In particular, the arguments deployed to emphasise that this is the only 
solution are that: water demand is  increasing due to population growth, immigration, 
and refugees, and water resources are limited and decreasing due to aridity and low 
precipitation, and climate change. When the governmental personnel were asked why 
this is the main solution, their reasoning was that the only solution is to increase 
water resources in the country through supply side and engineering solutions, and 
given that all rivers and tributaries have been dammed, wastewater treatment are in 
place, and the groundwater resources are being over-exploited, the main solution is 
 desalination through the RSDSC (interviews with governmental personnel 3, 4, 5, 6, 
7). This also shows the dominant supply side mentality in the water sector in Jordan, 
which backs the hydraulic mission of the state in order to solve the issue of water 
scarcity through mega projects. 
 
The December 2013 Agreement 
The Israeli, Jordanian, and Palestinian water ministers signed a new agreement on the 
9th of December 2013 (Ministry Foreign Affairs of Israel, 2013). The agreement has 
been advertised as the first phase of the RSDSC plan aiming at saving the Dead Sea 
(ibid.). The agreement is about building a desalination plant in Aqaba to provide 
water to Israel, Jordan will receive water from the Tiberias Lake, and Palestinians 
will be sold more water from Israel at a price and conditions to be negotiated among 
the two governments; and a small pipeline will connect Aqaba with the Dead Sea. 
A group of Palestinian NGOs sent a letter on the 21st of October, 2013 titled 
“Palestinian NGO statement on the World Bank-sponsored Red-Dead Sea Canal.” 
This letter to the Palestinian Authority and the PLO asked them to stop their support 
to the RSDSC as they see it as forcing the "Palestinian population to consent to their 
own dispossession and to compromise on their own rights." The criticism of the 
environmental NGOs resulted in further studies being done, and a delay of around 
three years (Glausiusz, 2013, Glausiusz, 2010).  
After the announcement of the 2013 agreement, the Palestinian civil society 
has strongly criticized the 2013 agreement, and as a Palestinian water expert put it, 
“the deal for Palestinians is, that they will be allowed to discuss even higher rates of 
dependency from Israel and its desalination surplus (additional 30 mcm/a). In this 
particular case, it will be extremely difficult for Palestinians to avoid paying the full 
desalination cost, or the „costs“ that Israel will unilaterally stipulate (for example 
including cross sector subsidies for Israeli agriculture included in domestic bulk 
water prices).” In fact, the agreement does not fix set costs for the water to be sold to 
Palestinians, but the cost it will have to be negotiated and agreed by Palestinians and 
Israelis. He concluded by stating that in this scenario, “Palestinians are out of the 
game”.  
A foreign diplomat based in the region explained that the reason for which the 
Palestinian minister signed the agreement, was due to the pressure the Palestinian 
Authority had received from the highest Jordanian and US officials (interview 11). 
Nevertheless, the official position of the Palestinian Authority is in support of the 
agreement signed, as underlined by the Palestinian Water Minister Mazen Ghunaim, 
 when speaking in 2017 at the Fourth Arab Water Week: “We reassure that Palestine 
is committed towards pressing ahead with the Red Dead project until it is fully 
implemented… we remain involved in ongoing hectic negotiations with Israel based 
on the memorandum of understanding which was signed in December 2013 in 
Washington,” aiming at saving the Dead Sea and the investments in the Dead Sea 
area (Namrouqa, 2017).  
Instead, for the Israeli Minister Shalom "this is a historic agreement that realizes a 
dream of many years and the dream of Herzl" (Israeli Ministry Foreign Affairs, 2013). 
This article asserts that while there is a return to Zionism as an official discourse, 
Herzl’s Zionism is essentially complete; hence, this discourse could be hiding other 
interests. This article asserts that this is a water exchange plan, with a regional 
perspective, opened and backed by the Jordanian dominant discourse of water scarcity.  
Also for a representative of the NGO Eco Peace (former Friends of the Earth 
Middle East) and a senior researcher at the University of Jordan, Jordan’s priority is to 
increase the water supply, also fearing further reduction of the water scarce resources 
due to the impacts of climate change, and the population would never accept to rely   
on Israel for its water supply. For this reason, they could not sign an agreement of 
water exchange with Israel, but only an agreement to save the Dead Sea with an 
element of water saving (Interviews 8 and 9). This shows that different discourses open 
the same policy-solution of a RSDSC, discourses embedding different interests.  
These discourses are situated in the broader context, which provides tools to 
explain the evolving dynamics, discourses, and interests. In fact, the Israeli interest is 
to support the Jordanian political stability, given the geopolitical Israeli priority of 
supporting the stability of its Jordanian ally. Looking at the broader context and at the 
Israeli interests, it is possible to capture the reasons why the Israeli government 
supports the Jordanian government by supplying more water or by supporting the 
RSDSC project, strongly wanted by the Jordanian government.  
Firstly, Israel and Jordan share their longest border. Second, Israel has diplomatic 
relations with Jordan, with which has strong military and security ties. For this reason, 
for Israel the Jordanian border is safe and well protected by the military and security 
cooperation with the Jordanian government. Third, Jordan is one of the two Arab 
countries that recognises Israel, contributing to providing Israel with political 
legitimisation. Fourth, the Israeli government sees Jordan as a buffer zone, a safe and 
stable political territory that divides them from Iraq and Saudi Arabia. Especially 
nowadays, Jordan separates and protects Israel from the Islamic State forces deployed 
in parts of Iraq and Syria. Fifth, Jordan absorbed several waves of Palestinian refugees, 
 and is seen from the Israeli government as a territory for the absorption of even more 
Palestinians in the next decades. Finally, both Israel and Jordan are close allies of the 
US.  
For all these reasons captured by looking at the broader context, the Israeli 
government has as a top priority maintaining and supporting the political stability of 
Jordan, and it does so also by strengthening the cooperation over water resources, as 
this is seen as vital by the Jordanian government (Barari, 2014, p. 69-71; Barari, 2004, 
p. 7; Solomon, 2014; Welsh, 2014). 
 
Discussion  
It emerges that the voices against the canal, while in the nineteenth century were only 
mentioned as potential, they became more effective and visible in the 1970s and 
1980s with the discourse of the international community within the UN and since the 
1990s with the environmental and human rights NGOs as well as some ministries 
within the same government supporting the plan.  
From a scale perspective, this article showed that while in the 19th century the 
proposals for a canal were linked to governmental scale interests and discourses were 
constructed and voiced by the governments, in the 20th and 21st centuries, counter- 
discourses were constructed and deployed by non-governmental actors, local 
communities, and international organisations. In other words, while in the nineteenth 
century the discourses were produced and backed by the government and the 
approach was mainly a top down one, in the twentieth and twenty-first century this 
was enriched also by counter-discourses mainly bottom-up, challenging the top-down 
governmental sanctioned discourses. Consequently, this resulted in a flourishing of 
discourses and counter-discourses constructed on different scales following and 
embedding different and competing interests. Nevertheless, discourse alliances of 
different interests supported and challenged the different proposals for a canal.  
The RSDSC plan and in particular the 2013 Agreement shows a discursive 
alliance of the three governments in support of the plan, which is somehow 
challenged by some NGOs and academics. The article showed how the three 
governments have deployed different discourses to publicly support the canal plan. 
 The Israeli government used Zionist discourses to support the agreement, de-
emphasizing aspects of regional cooperation while emphasizing completing the 
Zionist dream narrative. Instead, the Jordanian government focused on the discourse 
of water scarcity in the country and portrayed the canal and desalination as the only 
solution for Jordanian water security. The Palestinian government, instead, given the 
 few gains from the canal project, put at the centre the environmental discourse of 
saving the Dead Sea to try to find some support from its public opinion and to justify 
signing the agreement. This shows that the discourses developed over the last century 
are still very current and they are used still by the governments to justify their support 
(or lack of) to the new plans, to move the debate towards the environment, 
nationalism, or water security rather than discussing more politically contentious 
issues such as regional cooperation.  
In a nutshell, this article suggests that compared to the nineteenth and early 
twentieth century, in the last decades there have been more discourses constructed to 
support and to challenge the proposals, discourses constructed by actors on multiple 
scales and aiming at shaping the plans, as for the role played by environmental and 
human rights NGO, the World Bank, and the UN. 
Especially  since the peace agreements and the regional canal plans, it emerges 
a richness in the quantity and quality of discourses backing and challenging the 
RSDSC, with more actors involved at different scales, more goals, undeclared 
interests, and unofficial discourses at play than in the past. Further research could 
investigate the evolvement in the relation between the relevance of the public opinion 
in shaping policy and decision-making, to understand whether the increased 
deployment of discourses and structural power is targeted to the internal audience for 
domestic politics purposes. 
The political conflict here between the discourses is strongly influenced and 
guided by the broader context, in which the discourses are situated. By consideration 
of the broader context, this article identified the evolving interests and discourses. For 
instance, before the peace agreements of the 1990s, the political conflict was between 
the various governments, which had competing interests and generated discourses 
supporting different proposal for a canal. After the mid-1990s, this article argues that 
the evolving context has influenced the interests of the governments and stakeholders, 
and consequently it has animated and enriched a variety of discourses supporting and 
opposing the plan by actors on different scales. Consequently, the political conflict 
between the discourses becomes between pro and anti-project sides rather than 
between governments.  
 
Conclusion 
This article analysed the main plans for connecting the Dead Sea to either the 
Mediterranean or the Red Sea. In particular, it has examined the interests behind these 
plans and discourses supporting or challenging them, situating them within the broader 
 context. This article is situated within the literature of water history, and its original 
finding is that the discourses backing the plan of a canal have changed as the interests 
behind the plan evolved over time due to changes in the broader contexts. It has also 
showed that old discourses are still deployed today by the threegovernments to justify 
their cooperation, to find support from their public opinion, and to move the debate 
from regional cooperation – which is quite contentious – to issue of national security 
such as water security for Jordan; completing the Zionist dream for Israel; and saving 
the Dead Sea for Palestine.  
This article suffered from a general limitation of the data for the 19th and early 
20th century. This emerges from the availability of only dominant discourses and 
mainly at the state-governmental scale. It appeared difficult to find  discourses, which  
may have existed, against the proposed plans and from the local communities living  
in the area. In addition, research for that period has been mainly based on critical 
review, without the possibility of semi-structured interview to who was involved in 
suggesting those plans and promoting the discourses of that time. Semi-structured 
interview and critical discourse analysis result to be key for this study. 
Further research could explore the contexts where discourses are deployed by 
the different actors in different arenas in the last decades:  a peace discourse and to 
save the Dead Sea discourse at the World Economic Forum and World Bank in 
Washington D.C., and to desalinise water discourse promoted in other forum. Finally, 
further research could also analyse how the evolving regional context after the so-
called “Arab Spring” is shaping interests and discourses in relation to the proposal of 
a canal. 
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